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ABSTRACT 
In recent years important theoretical contributions have 
shown that majority rule is a very badly behaved collective choice 
mechanism. In the absence of artificial restraints on preferences 
majority rule processes are almost always in disequilibrium. 
Moreover, the extent of the disequilibrium is pervasive, as captured 
by the observation that "anything can happen". What are the 
implications of such nihilistic results for the study of democratic 
political processes? Some authors believe that the implications are 
major, that they in fact preclude the development of a science of 
politics. Other authors take a more sanguine view. This essay 
argues that equilibrium notions, as presently formulated, are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the development of a scientific 
study of politics. The newly proved disequilibrium results do suggest 
a change in the research agenda facing political scientists. The 
broad outlines of that agenda, and a general strategy for proceeding 
are discussed. 
Equilibrium, Disequilibrium, and the 
* 
General Possibility of a Science of Politics 
Morris P. Fiorina and Kenneth A. Shepsle 
l . Introduction 
Perhaps it overstates matters to say that there is a crisis in formal 
political theory, but it is apparent that much mischief has been caused by a 
series of theorems which depict the chaotic features of majority rule voting 
systems. These theorems, proved elegantly in recent papers by Cohen (1979), 
McKelvey (1976, 1979) and Schofield (1978), establish that the cyclicity of 
the majority preference relation is both generic and pervasive. To paraphase 
the title of a recent paper by Bell (1978), when majority rule breaks down, 
it breakes down completely; and it "almost always" breaks down. 
Although these results are of relatively recent vintage, and their 
implications are only now being traced, signs of intellectual indigestion are 
already observable. Certainly, there is no clear consensus on the import or 
significance of these results. At one extreme, some scholars continue 
business as usual. The new results simply constitute a political fact of 
life -- a fact that may be artfully employed to further an interest. Thus, 
Plott and Levine (1978) and McKelvey (1977, 1978), posing as latter-day 
Machiavellis, profess to offer advice to the price of a majority-rule 
corrmittee -- the chairman -- as to how he might manipulate the sequence of 
corrmittee votes in order to arrive at a final corrmittee decision identical 
to his ideal point. 
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At the other extreme, some scholars fear that the new disequilibrium 
results are inimical not only to current ideas about politics, but to the 
scientific enterprise itself. These scholars infer that in consequence of 
majority cycles, there are no political regularities ("anything can happen"), 
or that what appear to be regularities are inexplicable as equilibria in some 
model of politics. This latter view is advanced and discussed in a recent 
symposium on disequilibrium and majority rule (see Riker, 1980; Ordeshook, 
1980; and Rae, 1980). 
The Cohen-McKelvey-Schofield theorems are profound and, as noted 
above, are only now being digested by students of the science of politics. 
These results provide some basis for questioning the utility of equilibrium 
concepts and provide the occasion for us, in this paper, to explore the 
importance of equilibrium (and its absence) for a science of politics. 
We begin, in the second section, by reviewing the reasons why equilibrium 
concepts, in all the social sciences, are not what they are sometimes 
believed to be. Even when equilibria exist, they are often imprecise, 
unrelated to observable regularities, or dependent upon unjustified (if not 
perverse) individual behavior. In the third section, we advance a possibly 
controversial position -- that instances of disequilibrium, as in the Cohen­
McKelvey-Schofield results, are not nearly so serious or debil_itating for 
a science of politics as sometimes feared. We argue that the distinctions 
between equilibrium and disequilibrium are typically overdrawn, and that 
the existence of equilibrium in one model as opposed to another, or indeed 
in one discipline as opposed to another, is largely a matter of scholarly 
choice. In the concluding section, we offer a not particularly original 
suggestion that political theorists avoid the choices made in both economic 
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·theory and in recent efforts in formal political theory, and instead
follow a third path when formulating models to explain observed political 
regularities. 
2. Do Equilibrium Results Provide the Basis for a Science of Politics?
We have neither the competence nor the inclination to engage in an 
abstract discussion of the philosophy of science. Our viewpoint in this 
paper is that of practioners who feel confident that at least some part 
of their research activity is "scientific" in nature. To us, science is 
a method for comprehending the world, not as a collection of unique events, 
but in terms of regularities which may be observed in the world. Such 
regularities _ include the repeated occurrence of particular outcomes --
the regular formation of minimal winning coalitions, for example. They 
include the existence of trends -- by a variety of measures modern govern­
ments have steadily grown, for example. And such regularities include the 
existence of patterns -- the identification of an elections-economic cycle 
is an example. Regularities are preconditions of scientific analysis. 
Traditionally, the scientific method has aimed at formulating 
theories which would account for observed regularities. And a generally 
accepted condition for a theory to be judged scientific is that its 
implications be clear and specific. It is this condition that excludes 
"the will of God" or, according to many, psychoanalysis, from·the class of 
scientific theories. The implications of a scientific theory must be 
sufficiently clear and precise that competent scholars can agree upon 
real world data which could in principle be inconsistent with the theoreti­
cal implications. The question we pose is whether existing social science 
equilibrium theories generate such clear and precise implications. 
Certainly, if the concept of equilibrium present in social science 
equilibrium theories were akin to the concept of a "black hole" in space, 
social science theories would have clear and precise implications. Such 
equilibrium would have irresistible attracting power, and once attracted, 
nothing would escape them. Unfortunately, there are myriad equilibrium 
concepts in social science theories, and few put one in mind of black 
holes, even gray holes for that matter. Some of the problems with social 
science equilibria are well known and the subject of scholarly concern. 
Others are obvious but by general agreement not discussed -- the soft 
underbelly of social science. In this section, we will briefly review 
the state of social science equilibrium theory as a means of reminding 
our colleagues of how fragile most equilibrium theories are. 
We begin by noting the manner in which equilibrium concepts differ 
from "black holes," lacking either their drawing power or their capacity 
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to retain. Were a concept to lack both attraction and retention properties, 
then it certainly would be inappropriate to describe it as an equilibrium. 
If, on the other hand, it possessed both, then in some respects, it would 
be on a par with black holes. With this in mind, consider the set A of· 
alternatives, the majority dominance relation, >: AxA 4 A, anq an alter­
native, x*cA , with the following property: 
x* satisfies the condition that 
x* > y for every ycA - {x*J 
We can assert, though not without qualification, that if "black hole" 
equilibrium concepts are to be found in social science, then x* must 
be included among them. For surely it retains in the sense that, once 
arrived at, it is never departed from. Thus, if a majority trajectory 
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·(xl'x2,. .. ), where xi+l differs from x1 only if xi+l > xi' ever reaches
x* it remains there, since x* is undominated, viz., (x1,x2, • • •  ,xi,xi+l'···,
x*,x*, ... ,x*). Its attraction characteristics, however, must be couched
in a more contingent fashion. In particular, the attraction of x* depends 
not only on the majority dominance relation, >, but on the rules for com­
parison as well. Even if an x*cA exists, it may never be "reachable" from 
some specific initial status quo if it is excluded from comparison by 
features of the agenda-construction process. It may be said, however, 
that if there are no agenda obstacles, so that every majority trajectory 
must pass ultimately through x*, then, by stipulation, x* is an attractor� 
or sink. 
This distinguished point, along with the added stipulation, identifies 
a scientific ideal for the class of equilibrium notions in the context 
(>,A). But, on the strength of the Cohen-McKelvey-Schofield theorems, 
it is not very interesting in the following sense: if {(>,A)J is the 
family of contexts consisting of a set of alternatives and a majority 
dominance relation, and µ is an appropriate measure on subsets of this 
family, then the subset consisting of contexts in which x* exists is of 
measure zero. For our purposes, then, equilibrium concepts 1·:.ist have 
strong attraction and retention properties, but we cannot require x* as 
stipulated for then we risk (with near certainty--hardly a ris�!) coming 
up empty-handed. 
It is well-known that most current equilibrium ideas in political 
science and economics fall far short of the "black hole" desiderata in that 
they entail relaxing either the strong attraction property or the strong 
retention property that "black holes" possess. Consider first the core,
C �A, consisting of undominated outcomes: C = {xcAIY>X for no ycA}. 
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When x* exists, it is an element of C, but the requirements for membership 
in c are not so stringent. C consists of the set of strong retainers. 
If a majority rule trajectory moves into C, it will not depart; indeed, 
it will not leave the particular element of C at which it arrives. 
Yet, the following example from Ferejohn, Fiorina and Packel (1980) 
illustrates the well-known weakness of the core's attraction properties. 
Let there be four voters and five alternatives described by the following 
schedule of preferences: 
Voters 
! 2 3 .i 
xl X2 X3 X4
x2 X3 X4 Xl
X5 X5 X5 X5 
X3 X4 xl X2
X4 xl x2 X3
> is the strict majority preference relation according to which x > Y 
if and only if x obtains three or more votes against y. According to 
> , x1,x2,x3, and x4 cycle. None strictly majority dominates �5 -- hence
C = {x5}. However, x5 strictly majority dominates none of the remaining
alternatives, Thus, if the institutional matrix into which (>,A} is 
errbedded designates some xcA as the initial status quo, then only if x5
receives this designation will it ever be observed as the group choice. 
Lest the reader think this critique of the core (even when it exists) 
is limited to politics in g eneral and majority rule in particular, it should 
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be observed that the core of a private economy is plagued by similar defects. 
Weintraub (1979, p. 35), describing the grand edifice of general equilibrium 
thoery elaborated by Arrow, Debreu and McKenzie, concedes that "a particularly 
curious dynamic process was needed to ensure any robustness of [the core]." 
Noting, moreover, the state of flux in which stability theory, the study of 
dynamic adjustment, currently resides, he quotes one of its more eminent 
students, Frank Hahn, to the effect that the theory of dynamic adjustment 
to a general equilibrium consists of a "collection of sufficient conditions, 
anecdotes really.111 So it seems, then, that even when an equilibrium with 
strong retention properties exists, its accessibility depends upon the 
institutional matrix in which it is embedded; and our theories, thus far, 
of this larger context are only "anecdotes really." The core, in sum, is 
not only plagued by familiar existence problems; additionally, it may not 
be a very attractive equilibrium (pun intended!). 
Other cooperative equilibrium concepts fare no better. Whereas the 
core is retentive but not necessarily attractive, the stable set, 
bargaining set, and competitive solution (to select some of the more 
prominent alternatives to the core) tend to be attractive but not retentive. 
We restrict our remarks to the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, though 
they apply to the others as well. The stable set, or V-solutinn, is a 
collection of alternatives no one of which is dominated by any other and 
any nonmember of which is dominated by some member. Thus, for the 4-voter, 
5-alternative example of Ferejohn, Fiorina and Packel given above, there 
are two (nondiscriminatory) V-solutions, 
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The V-solution may not exist, as Lucas (1969) showed, but the more 
typical difficulty is one of nonuniqueness. In the particular example above, 
it turns out that every alternative is a member of some V-solution so that 
the process is tautologically characterized by a V-solution concept of 
equilibrium (no evidence could be adduced from this example for the propo­
sition that non-V-solution forces were at work). More to our point, 
however, is that either of the V-solutions in the example is attractive 
but not retentive. The process is always at a V-solution, as noted above, 
and always heading for the other, unless the process hits the core, x5
(which, if it exists, is always part of every V-solution). Indeed, in our 
example, unless at x5, the process will bounce between v1 and v2 , reflecting
the cycle among x1,x2,x3,x4•
These remarks extend to any collection of alternatives cum equilibrium. 
They attract but they do not retain. Indeed they may not even attract if 
local cycles are present. In the earlier example, if we add x6, x7, x8,
which cycle among themselves but each of which is dominated by x1, ... ,x5, it
is possible to observe the process caught in a local cycle x6+x7+x8+x6 -­
with neither v1 nor v2 ever being reached. Thus we arrive at equilibrium
concepts which "sometimes" attract and do not retain, hardly a firm basis 
on which to predict, explain, or control. 
Frustration with the V-solution convinced John Nash (1951) that 
noncooperative, unilateral behavior was both more basic and offered more 
promise for the formulation of fruitful equilibrium notions. But are 
noncooperative equilibria any more successful in attracting and retaining 
than their cooperative counterparts? A Nash equilibrium consists of a 
collection of individual choices, that jointly produce an outcome, in which 
which no individual, acting independently, has any incentive to alter his 
choice unilaterally. The cooperative generalization of this equilibrium 
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is the core, in which no coalition of players has an incentive to change 
their individual choices jointly. Like the core, and subject to the proviso 
of noncooperation, the Nash equilibrium retains but does not necessarily 
attract. If a social process arrives at a Nash equilibrium, then it will 
not depart since unilateral behavior -- the only kind allowed in this context 
-- will not support any change. But do individuals have any incentive to 
play their Nash strategies? Not necessarily. 
First, and perhaps of only minor importance, is the problem of 
imperfect Nash equilibrium. Imperfect equilibria, in Harsanyi's (1978, 
pp. 50-51) words, "assume highly irrational behavior [emphasis included] 
on the part of some players, yet they fully satisfy the mathematical defi­
nition of an equilibrium point." He illustrates this idea with a two-person 
example in which, in the extensive form, player 1 chooses a or b and, if 
he chooses the latter, player 2 then selects between x and y. The game 
tree is 
(O,v) ( ,2)
x y 
(l.v , 
There are two Nash equilibria, easily identified in the normal form: 
2 
x y 
a 1,3 1,3 
1 
b 0,0 2,2 
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Both (a, x) and (b, y) satisfy the mathematical definition of a Nash 
equilibrium; yet (a.x) is imperfect. As a glance at the extensive form 
provides, ft depends on player 1 choosing irrationally
2 inasmuch as he 
can reasonably assume player 2's self-interest will lead him (Mr. 2) to 
select y if 1 selects b. And, since 1 prefers (b, y) to (a.x), the latter 
does not attract. The bottom line, then, is that some Nash equilibria 
are inaccessible by rational choice unless a social process should find 
itself in that state, ex ante. 
A related, but more serious criticism addresses the incentive problem 
directly. To make this point, we consider the quintessential noncooperative 
circumstance -- the two-person zero-sum ga�. We offer the following 
partition of this class of games and speculate that the reader will find 
the Nash equilibrium established by von Neumann's Minimax Theorem an increas­
ingly less persuasive equilibri1111 concept as he or she descends the list: 
(1) Both players possess dominant strategies 
(2) Exactly one of the players has a dominant strategy 
(3) There are no dominant strategies, but there is a pure 
strategy equilibrium point and 
(i) one player believes the other will play a 
security level maximizing strategy 
or (ii) one player believes the other believes the first 
will play a security level maximizing strategy 
or (iii) there are higher-level conjectures about 
beliefs as in (ii). 
(4) There are no dominant strategies, there is a pure strategy 
equilibrium point, but (i) - (iii) in (3) do not hold. 
(5) There are no pure strategy equilibrium points. 
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Class (1) situations are hardly games at all since each player has a maximal 
element of his choice set unaffected by the choice of the other player; 
the resulting equilibrium is both attractive and retentive. Class (2) 
games differ only slightly. They require the same modicum of intelligence 
1n players as do class (1) games regarding dominant strategies, �· select 
them when they exist. In addition, they require in players a capacity to· 
recognize when the other guy has one. Again, the attraction and retention 
power of this equilibrium point is strong, though perhaps weaker than its 
predecessor class. For class (3) the attraction is weaker still since 
it is contingent on fairly specific beliefs of one player about the 
choices or about the beliefs of his opposite nurrber. By class (4) there 
fs only a flicker of attraction left and the persuasiveness of the Nash 
equilibrium is probably strong only in situations involving incredibly 
cautious players. In class (5) there is neither attraction nor retention 
(except in a very weak form) since, if one player believes the other is 
playing his "optimal" mixed strategy, he (the fonner) is nevertheless free 
to choose any of his pure or mixed strategies: all have the same expected 
value. 
Noncooperative equilibria, we believe, suffer defects similar to those 
we discussed in the cooperative realm. Their persuasiveness, especially 
regarding their attracting power, depends upon highly contingent circum­
stances of play. And the only way to determine whether these circumstances 
are reasonable to assume or are likely to transpire is to look at the world. 
There may be no accounting for tastes, as the old Latin expression tells 
us, but the necessity of some accounting, of an empirical sort, regarding 
attitudes, aversions, beliefs, or whatever becomes apparent -- a point to 
which we return in our concluding section. 
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We are not yet finished with our critique of equilibrium concept since 
we have not yet discussed some areas of discretion available to actors that 
are normally stipulated to be exogenous in many equilibrium theories. To 
�egin this discussion we note that economists generally regard theirs as a 
science of voluntary exchange in which the "hold harmless" rule applies. 
Accordingly, the choices by individuals to buy and sell, produce and consume, 
spend, save, and invest are regarded as voluntary acts that reflect 
individual assessments of their well-being. Ex ante, the individual believes 
his cricumstances will have improved, ex post, if he buys or sells or . .. 
compared to what it would be if he did not. 
Politics on the other hand is, in Riker's (1980) view, a considerably 
more dismal affair since it transcends the voluntary and is not constrained 
by the "hold harmless" rule. There are winners and losers, and losers lose 
not only in the sense of bearing opportunity costs, but often in the sense 
of being denied property rights, freedom, or even their lives. Under these 
circumstances (and we are not convinced it is that much different in eco­
nomics) losers have strong incentives to alter undesirable equilibria. 
And this possibility is clearly feasible if the equilibrium in question 
is nonretentive. Somewhat surprisingly, even if an equilibrium is 
"wel 1-behaved" in terms of attraction and retention, the theoretical frame­
work in which this obtains often has held constant a number of behavioral 
dimensions which, in fact, are variables. 
In economics, the notion of voluntary acquiescence or participation 
in economic activity is reflected in the ability of an individual to pick 
up his marbles and go home. If the terms of trade are unfavorable, he 
need not participate. In politics, this same option is (sometimes) avail­
able, though it is nonnally not accorded great import, in the fonn of 
emigration. To "avoid hann," an individual may resign from a club, with­
draw from a school, organization, or private society, or move to a 
different political jurisdiction. And emigration, broadly construed, 
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is one of the more extreme measures by which individuals lllil.Y destroy an 
otherwise prevailing equilibrium. It may be argued, of course, that if 
emigration is an available choice, then the so-called equilibrium is not 
really an equilibrium at all .3 And this is precisely our point.
-
Neverthe-
less, how many equilibrium theories begin "Consider a set N = {l, . • •  ,n} 
of players • • •  "? The context of most equilibrium theories is one in which 
the set of actors is fixed so that a political outcome or decision must be 
endured by all. 
Even if we stipultate that N is fixed, however, there still may be 
the means by which to upset an equilibrium. They include generating new 
alternatives or destroying existing alternatives (that is, not requiring 
the set A to be fixed and invnutable), altering the dimensions of choice 
(fixing A but changing the basis for evaluating or just thinking abo�t its 
elements), changing the rules of choice (allowing the dominance relation, > , 
defined on AxA, to change or to be detennined endogenously), or moving the 
decision to some new arena of choice. Each of these strategies for upsetting 
some prevailing equilibrium is corrmonly observed in everyday political life. 
This suggests that even the prospect of an undesirable equilibrium at one 
level provides the incentives for losers under that equilibrium to agitate 
for some fonn of change in the institutional fabric. In sum, even under 
the most convincing of our equilibrium concepts there exist features of 
any political or economic situation which are subject to strategic exploi­
tation. No law of logic requires that losers accept their status as losers, 
and empirical observation tells us that some do not. 
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This brings us to a related point. the final one we shall raise about 
the fragility of social science equilibrium. Most of our concepts are 
highly static -- even examples of dynamic equilibria presuppose a consider­
able amount of constancy. We take as given the set of actors, the set of 
alternatives, and the distribution of preferences. But just as losers have 
incentives to atten1Jt to alter such initial conditions, so, too, may 
exogeneous influences change those conditions. Even if it were in strong 
general equilibrium, we daresay that the U.S. economy would be perturbed 
dramatically by the sudden invention of cars which run on water. Or to 
take an example from the political realm, even if the early 19th Century 
Democracy were a reflection of a majority rule equilibrium (who knows?), 
how can we predict the kind of evangelical protestant revivalism which 
swept the Midwest in the ante-bellum period and made the slavery issue so 
much more potent in the 1850s than it had been a generation earlier? 
Or to take a more short-tenn example, how d0 we predict the swings in 
popular preference which lead to a heavy economic emphasis in mass voting 
behavior in the late spring of 1980 after a heavy foreign affairs emphasis 
in the winter and early spring? Even the chimerical x* introduced at the 
beginning of this section is woefully dependent on the absence of such 
changes. 
Thus, for any number of reasons, we conclude that social science 
equilibrium concepts, examined in an abstract context, fall short of 
providing the kind of predictability desirable in scientific theories. 
3. Do Disequilibrium Results Dash Hopes for a Science of Politics? 
Having argued that social science equilibrium theories often fail 
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to provide the predictability desirable in a scientific study of politics, 
we will now argue the obverse, namely. that the absence of such equilibria 
does not preclude the desired predictability. Our argument hinges on the 
simple distinction between "equilibrium" in the world, and equilibrium 
in our models. Conflation of the two is an understandable occupational 
hazard, but that does not excuse the confusion. 
Models provide partial descriptions of phenomena. A model which 
gave a complete description would be identical to the phenomenon of 
interest and therefore of little use to us. Thus, all models involve 
a restricted focus. a choice to examine or emphasize some aspect(s) of 
a phenomenon but to ignore or deemphasize others. This much is old hat 
(PS 401 at the University of Rochester). But the obvious implication is 
often overlooked: because models provide only partial descriptions, 
several can be applied to the same phenomenon and the resulting inferences 
may differ, even conflict. Ordeshook (1980) provides a simple example. 
Several plausible models applied to a simple market of one seller and two 
buyers produce several rather different predictions. A classical economic 
model predicts that the seller captures all the added value from exchange, 
while a game theoretic model predicts all the Pareto optimal allocations. 
Even more interesting in our view are situations in which a dis­
equilibrium inference from one model stands opposed to an equilibrium infer­
ence from another. In The Theory of Political Coalitions, for example, 
William Riker questioned the advisability of modelling political situations 
as games and of searching for possibly nonexistent or infinitely large 
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V-solutions (1962. pp. 36-39). His suggestion was to look at a different 
aspect of political situations. namely the coalitions which support the 
winning outcomes rather than the outcomes themselves. Riker believed 
that disequilibrium at the level of outcomes was compatible with equilibrium 
at the level of coalitions: 
It may be. of course. that the reasonable outcomes in an 
n-person model or an n-person real situation are in fact 
so numerous and diverse that systematic analysis and pre­
diction is impossible. But it may also be that game 
theorists have not asked the questions most useful to 
social scientists and that by exclusive emphasis on the 
attempt to delimit admissible imputations they have 
overlooked the possibility of delimiting coalition­
structures directly. (1962. pp. 38-39) 
Another example comes from the article by Ferejohn. Fiorina. and 
Packel (1980). After noticing that the nihilistic McKelvey et al. result 
did not appear to describe the <l,ynamics of experimental processes in 
which cycling and instability had free room to operate (Fiorina and Plott. 
1978). these authors proposed a Markov·model which provides a limiting 
probability distribution over the feasible outcomes of a majority decision 
process. Again. this work involves a shift in focus from past studies of 
majority decision making. Rather than examine the question of existence 
of stable outcomes, it attempts to examine in a systematic way the relative 
"difficulty" of moving from one (typically unstable) point to another, and
the constraints such relative difficulties might place on the majority 
decision process. 
As a third example, consider several recent papers by Kramer (1977, 
1978). Instead of considering an election as a discrete decision in 
which the McKelvey result is known to apply, Kramer embeds each electoral 
17 
decision in a time sequence of elections. This approach yields inferences 
other than "anything is possible." To wit. the model implies that any 
particular outcome is part of a "trajectory" that leads to the minimax 
set. which in this case is likely to constitute only a small part of the 
feasible set. 
As a final example of the simultaneous existence of disequilibrium 
and equilibrium inferences, consider Shepsle's (1979a.b) work on structure­
induced equilibrium (the product of both tastes and institutional arrange­
ments). Shepsle establishes conditions under which structure-induced 
equilibria exist while the set of preference-induced equilibria is 
empty. This work follows in the spirit of Duncan Black who in his early 
paper on the unity of political and economic science observes that 
"equilibrium in Politics is 'the resultant of tastes and obstacles'; 
and these are the words Pareto used of equilibrium in Economics." 
(1950, p. 118). "Obstacles" is Black's nomenclature for the forms of 
committee procedure that. in his view, combine with the preference scales 
of co11111ittee members to determine formal decisions. It seemed obvious to 
Black that political equilibria were inextricably linked to institutional 
arrangements which constrain political processes, just as economic equi­
libria are linked to often implicit institutional arrangements which 
constrain economic forces. 
In discussing the preceding examples, our purpose is not to assert 
that coalition models, stochastic models, dynamical models, or institution­
ally rich models are sure-fire means of exorcising the spectre conjured 
up by McKelvey and friends. Rather, our purpose is to establish that the 
existence of equilibria has as much to do with the choices made by the 
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scholar as with the characteristics of the phenomenon he or she is study­
ing. We describe and comprehend empirical phenomena through the lenses 
of particular models. And the particular lenses we use are Partially 
at least, a matter of choice. 
Continuing with this argument, it seems to us that our colleagues 
in Economics have deliberately chosen a research program different from 
that embraced by the younger generation of positive political theorists. 
As members of interdisciplinary "shops" we have both attended numerous 
economic theory seminars. In reflecting on these, it seems to us that 
they generally proceed under the constraint that only equilibrium-preserving 
extensions of models are of interest (i. e., publishable). The typical 
budding theorist adds to or generalizes an existing model and makes his 
or her personal contribution by showing that with the given addition or 
generalization an equilibrium continues to exist. When questioned as to 
why the modification or generalization was not done in some other way, 
theorists typically respond that the suggested alternative entailed either 
intractable problems or that no results could be established under the 
suggested alternative, i.e., in either case the alternative was "uninter-
esting." 
In contrast, McKelvey, Schofield and other political theorists 
have followed a path blazed by "Arrow's Mathematical Politics" (note 
the choice of tenninology by an economic theorist, Paul Samuelson) 
through the "impossibility" terrain of social choice theory. Positive 
political theory did not always follow this path. In the early develop­
ment of spatial models, the emphasis was on equilibrium results. The 
basic model was extended to different voter distributions, abstention was 
introduced, and sequential elections were considered, but always the 
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symmetry conditions which would produce equilibrium were imposed. Why this 
research program was abandoned is not clear; perhaps those involved became 
convinced that reasonably interesting equilibrium models of political 
situations constituted a set of measure zero. But it is not obvious that 
the situation is any different in economics. 
In fact, it is not outrageous to speculate about alternative scenarios. 
Political theorists might have decided early on that unidimensionality 
was a basic assumption of all political models, akin to the regularity 
conditions imposed on the consumption set by economists. Alternatively 
economists might have foliowed up Scarf's (1960) examples of instability 
which led Nikaido (1969, p. 337) to observe that "global stability is so 
special a dynamic property that contrary to the Walrasian view, one can 
hardly expect it to be shared by all competitive economies... [l]nstability 
seems to be a universal phenomenon in competitive economies, rather than 
an exceptional one, whereas global stability is expected to prevail only 
in very well-behaved systems." Perhaps some of the differences between 
economic and political theory arise less from the greater instability 
of political phenomenon than from the attraction of stability-loving 
personalities to economics vis-a-vis the gravitation of chaos-loving 
personalities to political science. 
If equilibrium is necessary for scientific prediction and explanation, 
and lack of equilibrium is fatal for those activities, it would seem that 
economics is scientific because its practioners have chosen to be whereas 
political science is not because its practioners have chosen not to be. 
In that case, the route to science is clear: we can choose to be scientists. 
This answer is facile, however. It is our belief that the cormlon element 
in the choices of both the economic and political theorists is that their 
theoretical choices arise from considerations mostly unrelated to and 
uninformed by the real world. Some attention to the latter provides the 
grounds for a "third way" to a science of politics, an old way too often 
overlooked by economic and political theorists. 
4. Conclusion and Modest Proposal
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Our tentative conclusions are several. First, most social science 
equilibrium concepts are, at best, distant cousins to what we have tenned 
"black hole" equilibrium. Specifically, they rarely are so conspicuous, 
so centripetal, or so retentive as their physical science ideal. And even 
when they are both attractive and retentive, they are embedded in a larger 
net of institutional and social relationships which, themselves, are not 
inmutable. Outcomes, whether equilibria or not, distribute gains and losses. 
losers may not be able to replace a prevailing outcome with one more to 
their liking, but surely they may agitate for change in the broader insti­
tutional matrix and, when successful, destroy an earlier outcome, whether 
an equilibrium or not. In consequence, the link between equilibrium 
and scientific predictability is both weak and tenuous. 
The same may be said about the link between disequilibrium and 
unpredictability. Disequilibrium, unpredictability, and chaos are certainly 
possible at some levels of political description. Indeed, they are generic 
and all-encompassing at the level of outcomes, if the theorems of Cohen, 
McKelvey and Schofield serve as plausible descriptions of majority rule. 
But notice the qualifications. First, we might observe in a committee's 
decisions over time no apparent pattern as it moves hither and yon through 
Euclid's space, Yet we might also observe that the decisive coalition 
each time, though different in composition, always contained no more members 
than necessary. Alternatively, we might discover that the changing decisions 
of the committee were perfectly associated with the 1deal point of the 
chainnan, whose identity rotated among conrnittee merrbers over time. 
(More incriminating, still, we might witness each chainnan having a 
drink at the bar with Dr. McKelvey just prior to his comnittee's 
deliberations!). In each of these instances, disequilibrium, chaos, and 
unpredictability, at one level are transformed into predictable regular­
ities, explicable in tenns of rationality and equilibrium, at some other 
level of conceptualization. 
There is a second important qualification to the interpretation of 
a disequilibrium result like those of Cohen, McKelvey and Schofield: 
it may not constitute a plausible description, even,at the conceptual 
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level at which the disequilibrium is established. Equilibria and dis­
equilibri a are properties of models. It remains to be demonstrated 
whether they are descriptive of empirical phenomena. One of the objectives 
of the Fiorina-Plott experiments was, in fact, to discover whether a host 
of ideas bearing on equilibrium and disequilibrium were empirically plaus­
ible under the best of experimental conditions; many failed their test. 
While we have hardly " proved" our dual conclusions that equilibrill!l 
models in the social sciences (including economics) are less than wholly 
persuasive for, and disequilibrium results less than wholly inimical to, 
a science of social phenomena, we think these conclusions rest on a solid 
base and would be agreed to by reasonable men. Arguably more controversial 
are several related points. The first is that an equilibrium concept should 
be regarded as a conceptual invention -- the property of a model, not of 
the world of phenomena. As a consequence, scholars have some degrees of 
freedom in choosing levels of analysis, models, and equilibrium concepts. 
And the usual philosophy-of-science criteria apply in this choice and in 
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the evaluation of the resulting scientific product. In our view, a model 
without equil1br1llll constitutes no more of a scientific i"llrovement in the 
state of knowledge than wh0lly complete description of the phenomenon in 
question. Each suffers the debility of failing to infonn. (Parenthetically, 
however, we acM!it that the discovery of disequilibrium serves the same con­
structive purpose as a "detour" sign: it cautions the traveler about trouble 
ahead and may even urge that an altogether different route be contemplated). 
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might the world be structured so that X is an anticipated feature of that 
world? " The answers (and there should be several) are models, all of which 
have in conmon the regularity X as a logical implication. We understand 
that most theoretical work resembles the retroductive process in that pure 
deduction seldom occurs; usually some desired result determines the choice 
of premises. What we are saying that is different is that the desired 
result should be based primarily on empirical regularity (at least on 
Each fails to isolate that which is regular and hence understandable (so-called "stylized facts"), rather than on its strength, neatness, or other aesthetic 
Mcomplete descriptions" fail in that they do not discriminate regularities criteria. Thus, regularity in the world should motivate scholars to 
from idiosyncracies and other attendant circumstances). 
So much for critical co11111entary. But what do we offer by way of 
positive recommendations? Our position is that scientific progress reflects 
(a) the scholarly choice of models which (b) possess equilibria which 
(c) correspond to observed regularities. This entails neither constructing 
equilibrium models ex ante, generalizing and refining subject to the con­
straint that equilibrium be preserved (the path traveled by most general 
equilibrium theorists in economics), nor retaining disequilibrium models 
only to be tongue-tied when asked to say something positive about the world 
of phenomena (the path recently traveled with seeming relish by some polit­
ical theorists). To travel the first path is to say little that applies 
to the world of phenomena, and to travel the second is to say little, period. 
Instead, we reconmend a third path, one termed "retroduction" by Charles 
Peirce. 
As exposited by Goldberg (1968) retroduction emphasizes the 
construction of theories, but it similarly emphasizes the importance of 
empirical regularities in that process. Put simply, the retroductive 
process begins with an empirical regularity, X, and poses the question "How 
construct the theoretical worlds in which that regularity exists. 
Construction of a world without regularities constitutes a failure, not an 
achievement, though as we have earlier noted, such failures may serve a 
useful purpose in identifying paths not worth pursuing and in suggesting 
enrichments by which to augment disequilibrium models in order to accommodate 
observed empirical regularities. Indeed, the central constructive feature 
of the Cohen-McKelvey-Schofield theorems is precisely that "other features," 
not the majority rule mechanism, are decisive in democratic institutions. 
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University, St. Louis. This paper has been prepared for the 
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Washington-Hilton, August 27, 1980. The authors acknowledge 
comments on an earlier draft, ranging from constructive hostility 
to benign neglect, from: Randall Calvert, John Ferejohn, Robert 
Parks, Charles Plott, Robert Salisbury, and Barry Weingast. 
l. Most mechanisms of dynamic adjustment in general equilibrium
theory are highly artificial "stories" -- artfUl fictions. The
classic mechanism, of which there are several variations, is
the tatonnement, a process in which a mythical market auctioneer
calls out a vector of prices, observes the plans rational economic
agents intend to follow subject to those prices, computes excesses
of supply and demand, and then announces a revised price vector
according to some adjustment rule. The actual implementation of
economic plans is permitted only after this price adjustment
process converges to an equilibrium. Arrow and Hahn (1971), after
two chapters of discussion and results on dynamic adjustment in
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their treastise on general economic equilibrium, are quite frank 
in their appraisal of tatonnement: 
Some of the difficulties we have encountered may be 
due to the abstraction of a tatonnement; this will 
be discussed in the next chapter. Even if it had 
been possible to show that in a perfectly 
competitive economy a tatonnement is always stable, 
it is not clear that such a result could have been 
given much weight in forming a judgment of the 
performance of the price mechanism in actual 
economies. The fiction of an auctioneer is quite 
serious, since without it we would have to face the 
paradoxical problem that a perfect competitor changes 
prices that he is supposed to take as given. In 
addition, the processes investigated in this chapter 
assume that, disequilibrium notwithstanding, there 
is only a single price for each good at any moment. 
It is also postulated that at each moment, the plans 
of agents are their equilibrium plans. Lastly, of 
course, there is no trade out of equilibrium. All 
of these postulates are damaging to the tatonnement 
exercise. It may be that some of the theorems and 
some of the insights gained will have application 
when a more satisfactory theory of the price mechanism 
has been developed. At the moment the main 
justification for the chapter is that there are results 
to report on the t�ltonnement while there are no results 
to re ort on what most economists would a ree to be 
more realistic constructions. Arrow and Hahn, 1971, 
pp. 321-322. [emphasis added] 
2. In some models it would not necessarily constitute irrationality
for player l to believe his adversary may deliver on a self­
damaging threat.
3. Assume for a moment that political science had developed theories
built around a "black hole" equilibrium concept, and that past
experience had shown such theories to be devilishly accurate
predictors of future states of society. Then the very act of 
making a prediction could be the stimulus for a mass emigration
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to Canada and/or Mexico, or even a violent revolution in the United 
States . If sufficiently powerful (i.e. credible) a s ocial science 
theory could provide human actors with the incentive to change the 
ceteris paribus conditions on which the theory's predictions depend. 
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